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PSRO - AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE SYSTEM AS A QUALITY
ASSURANCE MECHANISM
JOHN

R.

BALL*

With the passage of the Social Security Admendments of 1972,1
Congress established the Professional Standards Review Organizations
(PSROs) "to promote the effective, efficient, and economical delivery of
health care services of proper quality ' 2 for which health care providers
are reimbursed under federal programs. PSROs are local organizations
of practicing physicians that will attempt to determine whether- the health
care services provided to the beneficiaries of Medicare, Medicaid, and
Maternal and Child Health programs "conform to appropriate professional standards."' These organizations will review medical services to
determine whether they are medically necessary, whether the quality of
care meets professionally recognized standards, and, in the case of services
provided in an inpatient facility, whether the choice of facility is appropriate. The PSRO review incorporates various features of previous systems of peer review.
PSROs evaluate medical necessity and appropriateness of care by
means of a complex procedure. Initially, a local physician organization
develops the review criteria for local medical care. Screening, the first
level of review, is performed by nonphysicians who apply the predetermined criteria to an individual medical record. If information in the
record indicates that the criteria have not been satisfied, then the record
receives a second level of review conducted by a peer (physician) in
which individual patient variation may be considered. In this manner,
the bulk of the records can be screened rapidly, and physician time can
be limited to those cases requiring greater knowledge and experience.
Upon completion of the review prQcess, the PSRO recommends to the
government whether the reviewed health care services should be reimbursed.
* Chief, Medical Audit Branch, Division of Peer Review, Bureau of Quality
Assurance, Health Services Administration, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Rockville, Maryland. J.D., Duke University, 1971; M.D., Duke University, 1972.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare or any of
its components.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1 to -19 (1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1974). See also S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 261
(1972) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1230].
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1974). The congressional premise was that "only physicians are, in general, qualified to judge whether services ordered by other physicians
are necessary." S. REP. No. 1230, supra note 2, at 256.
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The PSRO system also includes programs that constantly review the criteria themselves and identify and correct deficiencies in health care delivery.
Because PSRO represents the federal government's most structured
attempt to control the quality of health care, and because the program has
begun operation in the midst of a malpractice "crisis," 4 it is not surprising that PSROs have been discussed in the context of the malpractice
system. 5 Since malpractice litigation serves diverse functions, although
none of them very well, any proposed alternative to malpractice litigation must fulfill those same functions. This article will analyze some of
the important concepts of various quality assurance mechanisms and
describe the workings of the PSRO system. It is hoped that PSRO will
obviate the need for malpractice litigation to serve as a principal source
of quality assurance. This change may enhance the attractiveness of alternatives to the malpractice system that address themselves to other facets
of the problem such as injury compensation.6
I.

QUALITY AssuRANcE IN MEDICAL CARE

A. An Overview
Concern over the quality of medical care is not new. Hippocrates in
the Physician's Oath recognized the physician's potential to do both harm
and good: "I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability
and judgment, but never with a view to injury and wrongdoing." 7 For
centuries, physicians have attempted to assure the good quality of their
practice. For example, tissue review, which involves the examination of
surgically removed specimens, is a routine procedure in most hospitals.
Medical records committees, which provide informal review of selective
patient records, are another means to assure the quality of medical practice. There are also numerous hospital conferences at which bad patient
results are scrutinized.
A major deficiency of many pastand present quality assurance programs, however, is that they have lacked organization and failed to develop
an adequate framework for appraisal. Too often the programs consisted
of random, retrospective reviews of individual cases, conducted without
the guidance of recognized standards.8 The care received by a particular
4. The "crisis" is not technically one of malpractice, but of costs, manifested
primarily in the relative unavailability of professional liability insurance.
5. See, e.g., Springer, PSROs: Implications for Legal Liability. TiE

HOSPITAL

1 (January 1975); Note, PSRO: Malpractice Liability and the Impact of the Civil Immunity Clause, 62 GEo. L.J. 1499 (1974); Editorial, PSRO and
Malpractice,J. LEGAL MED. 6 (Sept.-Oct. 1974).
6. See, e.g., O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective
No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. Rsv. 501 (1976).
7. See also Gordis, An Early Commentary on Medical Care, 292 NEw ENGLAND
J. MED. 44-45 (1975).
8. See A GUIDE TO MEDICAL CARE ADMINISTRATION, VOLUME II: MEDICAL CARE
AiPRAIsAL - QUALITY AND UTILIZATION 27 (A. Donabedian ed. 1969) [hereinafter
MEDICAL STAFF
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patient was examined, but it was not usually compared with objective
or predetermined standards.
The concept of designing quality assurance mechanisms that include
standards for measurement and a means by which to evaluate the results
of applying the standards is relatively new. The reasons for this delay can
be traced to the development of medical care itself. Less than a century
ago, patient care was primarily an interaction between only two people the patient and his physician. Since the practice of medicine was less
scientific, assurance of quality depended on the physician's knowledge,
skill, and his Hipprocratic "judgment." As medical knowledge expanded,
the responsibility for patient care extended to a larger number of people
who performed loosely defined roles. Only recently have quality assurance
mechanisms considered this shift in the practice of medicine.9 Individual
physician judgment has continued to be the dominant factor in quality control. In order for quality assurance to be effective and measurable, physician judgment must be supplemented by a consistent structure of review
that employs appropriate standards of practice. 10
Any system that attempts to assure the quality of medical care must be
able to evaluate the quality of care provided. Although there were several
earlier efforts at formulating a structured approach to assessing medical care
quality, the most significant progress in the development of methods occurred during the last quarter century.1 Paul Lembcke has divided the
cited as Donabedian]; Beaumont, Feigal, Magraw, DeFoe & Carey, Medical Auditing
in a Comprehensive Clinic Program, 42 J. MED. EDUC. 359 (1967); Zimmer, An
Evaluation of Observer Variability in a Hospital Bed Utilization Study, 5 MED.
CARE 221 (1967).
9. Lembcke, A Scientific Method for Medical Auditing (Part I), 33 HOSPITALS
65 (June 16, 1959) [hereinafter cited as Lembcke].
10. See R. BROOK, QUALITY OF CARE ASSESSMENT: A COMPARISON OF FIVE
METHODS OF PEER REVIEW 59 (1973) ; Donabedian, supra note 8, at 5-7; P. ELLWOOD,
P. O'DONOGHUE, W. McCLURE, R. HOLLEY, R. CARLSON & E. HOAGBERG [INTERSTUDY], ASSURING THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 4-5 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as
INTER STUDY]; Donabedian, Promoting Quality Through Evaluating the Process of
Patient Care, 6 MED. CARE 181 (1968) ; Eisele, Slee & Hoffmann, Can the Practice
of Internal Medicine be Evaluated?, 44 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 144 (1956);
Lembcke, Medical Auditing by Scientific Methods, 162 J.A.M.A. 646 (1956) ; McKillop,
Assessing Quality of Medical Care, 19 HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATION 20 (Fall, 1974);
Morehead, The Medical Audit as an Operational Tool, 57 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1643
(1967); Payne, Continued Evolution of a System of Medical Care Appraisal, 201
J.A.M.A. 536 (1967) ; Williamson, Evaluating Quality of Patient Care: A Strategy
Relating Outcome and Process Assessment, 218 J.A.M.A. 564 (1971).
11. Although it has received wide usage only recently, the concept that quality
assurance requires both a structured program and an appraisal mechanism has often
been advocated by pioneers in the field. Leonard Rosenfeld identifies Florence Nightingale as an early pioneer because of her work published in 1858 comparing the mortality
in the British army during the Crimean War with that of civilian populations. See
Rosenfeld, Standards for Assessing Quality of Care in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCAToN & WELFARE, QUALITY ASSURANCE OF MEDICAL CARE 10 (1973)
[hereinafter cited
as Rosenfeld]. In 1914, E.A. Codman, considered the father of the medical audit (the
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existing methods of medical audit into three categories, "statistical,"
"scoring," and "scientific."' 12- Lembcke's three categories are not exclusive,
but instead each marks a point along a continuum of methods of review.
The statistical method, apparently first used about 1920, involves the compilation and comparison of data designed to reflect the process of care, such
as population characteristics, hospital size, length-of-stay in the hospital,
the number and kind of procedures performed, and other indices of care.
In the early 1950's, the Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities (CPHA) was formed, 13 and today, with the aid of computers, processes, displays, and summarizes large masses of data that are relevant
to the appraisal and control of medical care. Over one thousand hospitals
currently subscribe to the services offered by CPHA, such as the Professional Activity Survey, the Medical Audit Program, and Length of Stay
Package, which supply statistical measures of hospital and physican performance.
The problem with relying solely on the statistical method for quality
assurance is that statistics merely describe and compare results. Furthermore, the earlier efforts of the CPHA emphasized institutional performance rather than the performance of the individual physician. 14 Statistical
findings do not of themselves suggest modes of action because there is
no comparative absolute standard. A related criticism by Lembcke is
that a statistical method does not significantly rely upon, or contribute to,
a theory of cause and effect. 15
The scoring method of medical audit was developed and refined by
Wesley Eisele, who reviewed individual patient records by focusing on the
procedures employed by the physician. 16 The audit compared the proceprocess of review of medical care), observed that the proper objective of medical
auditing was the end result; by this he meant whether the diagnosis or treatment
produced the maximum cure or improvement that could be expected and whether the
result was beneficial. See Codman, The Product of a Hospital, 18 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRIcs 491 (1914). In 1918, the American College of Surgeons launched
a system of hospital inspection, which was initially based on Codman's "accounting"
or "end result" system. But a number of factors (see Rosenfeld, supra, at 10) limited
the efforts of the college to establish standards of organization, procedures, and facilities, rather than examining end results. This approach was apparently based on the
assumption, ingrained in current licensing statutes, that given adequate facilities, effective organization, and an efficient review system, good care will follow. Although
experience has shown that these methods alone are not sufficient to ensure satisfactory
results of care, [see INTERSTUDY, supra note 10, at 29] it is nevertheless true that the
systematic reviews conducted by the American College of Surgeons were a significant

factor in improving the quality of in-hospital care. See Rosenfeld, supra, at 10.
12. See Lembcke, supra note 9.
13. Id. at 68.
14. See Donabedian, supra note 8, at 22.

15. Lembcke, A Scientific Method for Medical Auditing (Part II), 33

HOSPITALS

65 (July 1, 1959).

16. See Eisele, Methods of Evaluating Medical Care in Hospitals, 53 RocKY
MT. MED. J.

1117 (1956).
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dures against predetermined criteria. While this method appeared to
improve the medical record and the quality of care, it had two major
weaknesses: the criteria employed were subjective, often determined by
individual hospitals, and it measured success in terms of compliance with
procedures rather than by reference to achievement of "end results."
The development of the concepts employed in the statistical and scoring
methods (i.e., data-gathering and the comparison of cases to criteria)
provided a foundation for the construction of more refined procedures of
quality assessment. The early work of the American College of Surgeons,
for example, offered a model for the original standards established by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).17 Nevertheless,
the early efforts of the JCAH suffered because there was no adequate
methodology for measuring quality. 8
Lembcke introduced a fresh approach. Drawing upon the concepts of
the statistical and scoring methods, he improved them by relating the
objective data produced by those methods to an articulated theory of
cause and effect. The main features of Lembcke's "scientific" system were:
classifying diagnoses into defined groups for comparison with predetermined criteria; verifying written statements in the clinical record; establishing the accuracy of laboratory reports; comparing the facts with the
criteria; measuring the degree of compliance with the criteria against a
standard degree of compliance; and computing incidence rates for the
hospital's service community.1 9
Lembcke's system contained three important departures from previous audit systems. First, it recognized the need to include the patient
in an audit before evaluating the outcome of his treatment. Before
determining whether a patient was "successfully" treated for a specific
disease, it must be established that the patient actually had the disease.
Second, Lembcke's system allowed innovation in diagnosis and treatment
because its recognition of degrees of compliance with the criteria provided
flexibility. Finally, the system demonstrated an understanding that the
quality of care can not be effectively evaluated solely through review of
individual cases; the patterns of care must also be audited.2 0 Applying this
method, Lembcke developed criteria for his own use in external audits
17. See Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 10.
18. Recently, the JCAH has shifted its emphasis. Rather than attempting to ensure conditions that would permit the delivery of high quality care, the focus is now
on auditing and improving patient care. With the introduction of the Performance
Evaluation Procedure (PEP), criteria for quality medical care are developed, medical
practice is measured against these criteria, and the data is analyzed with a view toward
identifying deficiencies and taking corrective action. See JOINT COMMISSION ON
AccREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, THE PEP PRIMER (1974). These same general steps
are part of the Medical Care Evaluation (MCE) study, which is an important part of
the PSRO review system. See text accompanying notes 92-97 infra.

19. Lembcke, A Scientific Method for Medical Auditing (Part II), 33 HOSPITALS
65 (July 1, 1959).
20. Id.
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that he performed, at the invitation of hospitals, to determine whether
certain medical procedures were justified. A further refinement of his
system, a modification of which PSRO utilizes, was developed by Beverly
Payne. 21 The Payne criteria differ from those of Lembcke in that they
are developed by and agreed upon by the medical staff of the hospital, and
the audit is internal, not external. 22 An internal audit is performed by the
hospital staff themselves rather than by outside consultants.
Thus, in the last quarter century methods of quality assessment have
become more "scientific"; the original principles of structured review based
on predetermined criteria have been extended, refined and modified, and
actual audits demonstrate that these techniques are practical and effective.
This scientific method is superior to the traditional method of record
review, in which the medical staff examine haphazardly selected charts,
because it more accurately reflects the whole range of care provided in
an institution. The traditional method suffers from two serious flaws: it
relies on the implicit and subjective clinical judgments of the individual
reviewer, and it does not disclose patterns of improper care that might be
corrected. The review offered by PSRO, the JCAH, and other criteriabased systems remedy those deficiences.
B.

Inputs, Processes, and Outcomes

As the medical audit and other mechanisms of quality assessment
became more "scientific," medical care came to be categorized in terms of
points along a continuum. Previous methods of medical audit focused
on certain isolated segments of the process of care. 23 In 1966, however,
Avedis Donabedian identified the three major approaches to the overall
evaluation of medical care: structure (synonymous with "input"), process,
and outcome.24 These three concepts, which form the basis of the modern
medical audit, recognize that medical care is not a single event but occurs
over a period of time. Input, the first stage, refers to the structure within
which care is provided. 25 It encompasses the personnel, environment, and
instrumentalities that contribute to the provision of care. The concept of
input is not limited to the physical aspects of facilities and equipment, but
includes the administrative organization and the qualifications of health
professionals. Donabedian observes that considerations of input as an
indicator of quality involve two assumptions: that it is possible to identify
21. See Payne, Continued Evolution of a System of Medical Care Appraisal, 201
J.A.M.A. 536 (1967); text accompanying notes 85-98 infra.
22. See Donabedian, supra note 8, at 27-28.
23. For example, Codman looked primarily at "end results" (see note 11 supra)
and the American College of Surgeons emphasized the structure in which care was
provided (see note 17 and accompanying text supra).
24. See Donabedian, supra note 8, at 14-41.
25. Id. at 2. See also Carlson, Health Manpower Licensing and Emerging Institutional Responsibility for the Quality of Care, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 849,

860-61 (1970).
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what is "good" in terms of staff, facilities, and organization, and that
better care is more likely when better qualified staff, improved physical
facilities, and sounder fiscal and administrative organization are employed.20
He further emphasizes, as have several others,2 7 that input should not be
equated with quality; the concept of input merely reflects the expectation
that good inputs are more likely to produce good quality care.
Evaluation of process is the second approach to the assessment of
medical care described by Donabedian. The process of medical care
encompasses the activities of health personnel in the management of patientS2s through diagnosis and treatment. Reliance upon process as an
indicator of the quality of care also entails two assumptions: that medical
care is useful in maintaining and promoting health, and that particular
elements of care are known to be related directly to certain health outcomes.2 9 Furthermore, if the evaluation of process is to produce useful
results, there must be a major working assumption that diagnosis and
treatment make a difference in how patients feel. In addition, when criteria
are developed for the evaluation of process, there is an assumption that each
criterion relating to an element of care has some bearing on patient results.
For example, one criterion for the evaluation of the process of diagnosis of
appendicitis might be an "abdominal examination." In such a case, the
implicit assumption is that the performance of an abdominal examination
on a patient suspected of having appendicitis makes a difference in the
patient's "end result."
Finally, the concept of outcome of medical care involves such diverse
items as morbidity, mortality, work status of the patient, and patient
satisfaction. Focus on the outcome of care necessarily involves the patient
and reflects a primary concern for health status and the achievement of
health objectives.
Input, process, and outcome are interrelated and each corresponds to
a segment along the medical care continuum.

Any method that seeks to

evaluate care, or control the quality of care must incorporate these elements.
A method that concentrates on only one component cannot determine
whether quality care is being administered or whether quality care will
continue.
26. See Donabedian, supra note 8, at 2-3.
27. See, e.g., INTERSTUDY, supra note 10, at 30-31; Cohen, State Licensing Boards
and Quality Assurance: A New Approach to an Old Problem, in U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, QUALITY ASSURANCE OF MEDICAL CARE 49--55
(1973); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT ON LICENSURE AND
RELATED HEALTH PERSONNEL CREDENTIALING 5-6 (1971) ; Carlson, Health Manpower
Licensing and Emerging Institutional Responsibility for the Quality of Care, 35 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 849, 859-61 (1970).
28. See Carlson, Health Manpower Licensing and Emerging InstitutionalResponsibility for the Quality of Care, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 849, 859-62 (1970);
Donabedian, supra note 8, at 3.
29. See Donabedian, supra note 8, at 3.
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While methods for assessing input, process, and outcome were being
developed and slowly introduced within the medical profession, measures
intended to control the quality of care were also evolving.3 0 As with assessment measures, these control devices focused on the input segment of the
medical care continuum 8 ' in such areas as personnel, facilities, equipment,
and organization. Few controls have been developed for the process or
outcome areas.
The various input control measures include undergraduate and graduate school admission requirements, the education process, initial professional
licensing, and specialty certification. With respect to facilities, the relevant
factors include accreditation of schools and health care institutions, building codes, and public health standards. All these controls, most quite detailed, seek to assure that there are good inputs that will produce good
32
patient outcomes.
An increasing number of critics suggest that the benefits of input
regulation may have been overestimated. 3 Several studies disclose little
correlation between such elements as length of training, board certification,
hospital accreditation, or examination scores and quality of care. 34 Although historically input regulation was used because it was the only
available methodology, regulation of input may also have been emphasized
because it focused more on the provider of care than on the consumer.
While the original purpose of licensing was to protect the public from
dishonest and incompetent practitioners, it also allowed the profession to
decide who will practice.3 5 Professional educational standards have the
potential to produce the same effect.8 6 Yet the consumer is primarily
30. Assessing quality and attempting to control it are different problems. The
former involves measurement and analysis; the latter involves dictating standards.
There is, of course, some interrelationship between the two - goal assessment may
involve the identification and correction of deficiencies. In addition, control measures
should reflect assessment findings that changes are indicated and that the dictated
standards are appropriate.
31. See INTERSTUDY, supra note 10, at 28-31; Carlson, Health Manpower Licensing and Emerging Institutional Responsibility for the Quality of Care, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 849, 860-61 (1970).
32. See Donabedian, supra note 8, at 2.
33. See, e.g., Carlson, Health Manpower Licensing and Emerging Institutional
Responsibility for the Quality of Care, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 849, 860 (1970);
Lave & Lave, Medical Care and Its Delivery: An Economic Appraisal, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 252 (1970).
34. See, e.g., INTERSTUDY, supra note 10, at 29 ("The point is that while some
correlation exists between input regulation and outcomes performance, it is not sufficient to prevent a high degree of variability in quality of care and perhaps even
unsatisfactory overall levels of care.")
35. See U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH,

EDUCATION & WELFARE,

REPORT ON LICENSUR

2 (1971).
36. Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply of Physicians,35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
267, 268, 282 (1970). See also Cohen, Regulatory Politics and American Medicine, 19
Am. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 122 (1975).
AND RELATED HEALTH PERSONNEL CREDENTIALING

574
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concerned with the outcome, less with the process of care, and still less
with the input. Given this patient attitude it is ironic that quality assurance
programs have stressed the input segment of the spectrum.
Control measures directed at the process of care are fewer and less
formal than input controls. The current control techniques are peer review, 8 7 utilization review, 8 continuing education requirements,8 9 tissue
committees, license revocation, suspension, and other sanctions. But the
present and past forms of review lack both predetermined standards, which
would allow comparisons of care, and a structure, which would enable
40
objective review.
Several observers have suggested that there are no quality assurance
mechanisms concerned with the outcome segment of the medical care
continuum. Most agree that the assessment of outcome should reflect

the condition of patients at the conclusion of care and that standards for
outcomes should reflect general patterns of care rather than individual
cases. 41 The following section will examine whether malpractice litigation
actually serves as a control over the outcome of care.
C.

The Malpractice System as a Quality
Assurance Mechanism

The medical malpractice tort system serves three general functions:
quality assurance, discipline, and compensation. Whether such a haphazard system can be efficient, just, or adequate in any of those capacities
is questionable. 42 Although the threat of litigation by a dissatisfied patient
37. See generally R. BROOK, QUALITY OF CARE ASSESSMENT: A COMPARISON OF
FmVE METHODS OF PEER REvIEw (1973) ; Donabedian, supra note 8, at 1-2.
38. See, e.g., Nelson, Relation Between Quality Assessment and Utilization Review
in a Functioning PSRO, 292 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 671 (1975). See generally
Jacobs & Christoffel, The Rationale for Outcome Audit, in JOINT COMMISSION ON
ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, THE PEP PRIMER (Part III) 13-24 (1974).
Hospital-based utilization review is supposed to assure appropriate allocation of
hospital resources. It seeks to determine whether a particular patient requires a
particular unit of health service, be it an admission, a period of hospital stay, or a
specified diagnostic or therapeutic procedure. Generally, utilization review must
be accomplished concurrently rather than retrospectively as with audit - because
once a unit is allocated it is then consumed, and the cost consequence is immediately realized.
Id. at 17.
39. Maryland, for example, by statute has empowered its Board of Medical
Examiners to establish continuing education requirements as a condition of reregistration. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 128(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
40. See Lembcke, Medical Auditing by Scientific Methods, 162 J.A.M.A. 646
(1956).
41. See, e.g., Jacobs & Christoffel, The Rationale for Outcome Audit, in JOINT
COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, THE PEP PRIMER (Part III) 30-32
(1974).
42. See, e.g., Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance" - Has Its Time Come?,
1975 DUKE L.J. 1233, 1234-35; O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Lia-
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may influence the quality of medical care, 43 the extent and effectiveness of
this deterrence are uncertain at best. Yet consumers perceive the malpractice system as an important means of quality assurance because there
is no other course available to them. During the current malpractice
crisis, the primary opponents to changing the malpractice system have been
the representatives of the patient-consumer, the plaintiffs' bar.44 Because
the malpractice system is thought to offer quality control to the consumer,
any alternative to the present scheme of patient compensation that fails to
recognize the consumer's interest in quality would be inadequate.
Although the malpractice system can serve as a quality assurance
mechanism, it is grossly inefficient in this capacity, for its primary mode
of control is deterrence, the threat of a lawsuit in the event of malpractice.
The system has not developed a review procedure that could routinely
identify bad practice and effect changes. While malpractice liability purports to use a standard based on the due care exercised by others similarly situated, the standards of measurement are not always valid, and in
some cases a court may substitute its independent judgment as to the
proper standard of care. 45 The failure to identify bad outcomes in a
systematic fashion, the absence of any procedure for changing the process
to achieve outcomes, and the lack of any process designed to evaluate the
effect of the system, all argue against the continued reliance on the medical
malpractice tort system for quality control.
The malpractice system is also seen as a means to discipline health
care providers, but it is equally deficient in this respect. In many states,
the only sanction available to a licensing board against physicians who
commit malpractice is revocation.46 Understandably, the state boards are
bility: Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv.
501, 501-20 (1976).
43. It is generally accepted that the malpractice system does not provide a very
good control on the outcome of patient care. See Jacobs & Christoffel, The Rationale
for Outcome Audit, in JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OP HOSPITALS, THE
PEP PRIMER (Part III) 10 (1974). See generally Brook, Brutoco & Williams, The
Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1197.
44. See remarks of Robert Cartwright, President of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America, in SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE HousE
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 25-26 (Subcomm. Print 1975) (citing instances
in which diligent trial lawyers, working under the contingency fee system, have been
responsible for rooting out and bringing before the bar of justice many incompetent
and negligent doctors).
45. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), noted in
O'Hern, Leading Cases, 230 J.A.M.A. 1577 (1974); Bradford, A Unique Decision,
J. LEG. MED. 52 (Sept./Oct. 1974).
46. For a discussion of the deficiencies of licensing as a means of quality control,
see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 51-52 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as HEW
REPORT]; Brook, Brutoco & Williams, The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice

and Quality of Care, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1215-17.
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reluctant to impose such Draconian measures, although recently state
legislatures and physician groups have expanded the range of disciplinary
measures.4 7 Another problem is that most state boards lack the power
to discipline solely on the basis of incompetent practice. 48 Nevertheless,
to some the malpractice system appears to close this gap in the disciplinary process because it offers a means of disciplining the incompetent
physician.
Malpractice liability also functions inefficiently as a system of patient
compensation. It is estimated that only sixteen percent of the professional
liability premium dollar eventually reaches the injured plaintiff. 49 This
figure is somewhat misleading since the real purpose of professional liability insurance is not to compensate patients but to defend physicians
against claims. Nevertheless, it indicates the inordinate administrative
costs associated with the malpractice system and the need to develop
other compensation schemes that minimize these costs.
Thus, aside from its historical background in tort law, the malpractice
system continues because it is the only game in town. It provides the only
control on the outcome of medical care; it offers one method of physician
discipline, and it serves as the primary mechanism of patient compensation.
While it is inefficient, unjust, or inadequate in performing these functions,
it continues to operate because there are no alternatives and because it
is the only current process that considers the interests of the consumer.
Any alternative to the malpractice system must therefore address those
interests.
II.
A.

PSRO

An Overview

Professional Standards Review Organizations involve a system of
review operated at the local level by practicing physicians. These physicians
review the medical necessity and appropriateness of care that is reimbursed
under federal programs. The PSRO seeks to assure that the medical
47. See A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 7 (D. Warren
& R. Merritt eds. 1976).
48. See HEW REPORT, supra note 46, at 52.
49. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION AND QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
5 (D. McDonald ed. 1971). For other estimates, see O'Connell, An Alternative to
Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries,
60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 506-12 (1976) (estimating that the malpractice tort system
returns 28 cents of the premium dollar to injured patients, of which only 12.5 cents
reimburses the patient for losses not otherwise compensated) ; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM.
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., AN OVERVIEW OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5 (Comm. Print 1975) ["The amount of each premium dollar
actually awarded to the patient or his legal representative may range from 16 to 38
cents, depending upon which estimate is accepted." (remarks of Representative Hastings) J; HEW REPORT, supra note 46, at 33-35.
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services meet professionally recognized standards of care. In the case of
inpatient care, the local PSRO must also determine whether the setting
(i.e., acute care hospital, nursing home, etc.) of that care is appropriate.
The 1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act 5" adopted this concept.
The legislation was based on the concept that physicians are the most
appropriate judges of the quality of medical services and that peer review
at the local level is the best method for assuring the appropriate use of
health facilities. The local PSRO provides the structure for the operation
of this procedure.
The legislation required the Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to designate PSRO geographic areas and then
enter into agreements with qualified organizations in each area.51 Prior to
January 1, 1978, only a nonprofit professional association representing a
substantial portion of the practicing physicians in the area can qualify as a
PSRO.5 2 After that date, if no physician organization has applied, the

Secretary can designate any other group that has the competence to
perform PSRO functions.5"
Initially, review will be limited to institutions such as short-term acute
care hospitals and skilled nursing facilities, although the legislation does
not prohibit the review of ambulatory care. 54 PSROs are to delegate the
duties of review to local institutions if their internal review procedures are
found to be effective.5 5 The PSRO must review the physician and patient
profiles of the institutions and apply regional norms of care in the review
process. 56 Fiscal intermediaries (those public or private agencies which,
by agreement with HEW, make the payments reimbursing providers under
Medicare) 5 7 must accept a PSRO determination regarding the necessity
58
of care in reimbursing Medicare claims.
On March 13, 1974, the Secretary designated 203 geographic areas
within which PSRO's would be established. 59 Qualified physician organizations applied for and were awarded contracts by HEW for the initial
planning phase of review activities. Local PSROs have subsequently
"graduated" to conditional status, in which the review activities and
capacity are developed and expanded. If at the end of the conditional
period the Secretary finds that the PSRO has satisfactorily demonstrated
its effectiveness, it will become fully qualified and operational. 60 By July
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1 to -19 (1974).

51. 42U.S.C. § 1320c-1(a) (1974).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1(b)(1), (c)(1) (1974), as amended Pub. L. 94-182,
§ 108 (Dec. 31, 1975).
53. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(g) (1974).

55.
56.
57.
58.

42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(e) (1) (1974).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-4 (a) (4), 1320c-5(a) (1974).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395h (1974).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-4(a) (1), 1320c-7 (1974).

59. See 39 Fed. Reg. 10204 (1974).
60. 42U.S.C. § 1320c-3(b) (1974).
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1, 1976, there were 87 local PSROs in conditional status and 33 areas in
the planning phase, a total of 120 areas representing 46 states, the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
The PSRO program structures data collection, processing, and reporting so as to assure maximum efficiency, economy, and coordination in
all data-gathering efforts as well as compatibility of data across different
geographic areas. 61 Data generated from the Medicare and Medicaid programs is to be utilized to the greatest extent possible. The law requires
that the information remain confidential and that disclosure be limited to
the amount necessary to perform PSRO functions while protecting the
62
rights of patients, practitioners, and other providers.
The statute grants review and a hearing in the event of an adverse
PSRO determination6 8 and also provides for the imposition of sanctions
against practitioners and institutional providers. 64 While regulations have
not yet been promulgated to elaborate those provisions of the statute, the
Secretary may terminate or suspend Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement
for services by a provider who is responsible for gross or continued overutilization of services or for inadequate quality of service. In the alternative,
the Secretary may require the offending person to reimburse the government money already received up to five thousand dollars for medically
unnecessary services.65
The local PSRO is the most important unit in the structure of the
PSRO program. In states with three or more PSROs, Statewide Professional Standards Review Councils, which include representation of
non-physicians, are to be established. 66 The Statewide Council serves
several functions: the coordination of PSRO activities within a state, the
dissemination of information, and review of PSRO performance.
The National Professional Standards Review Council, the third major
component of the PSRO structure, consists of physicians who are recognized authorities in the review of medical care. 67 It currently has eleven
members appointed by the Secretary. Its primary function is to collect data
and other information and disseminate it to PSROs, particularly information relating to the development and application of norms, standards, and
criteria for care. It also serves as a policy advisory group to the Secretary.
PSRO, with certain exceptions, is not a hierarchical system. Each
component (the local PSRO, the Statewide Councils, and the National
Council) performs distinct functions. The local PSRO is responsible for
performing review, the Statewide Council coordinates PSRO activities,
61. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
§ 107 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PSRO
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-15 (1974).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-8 (1974).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(b) (1)-(2) (1974).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(b) (3) (1974).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1 (1974).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-12(a), (b) (1974).
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and the National Council addresses general policy matters. Information is
exchanged between the levels, but neither the Statewide nor the National
Council exercises continuous supervision over local PSRO activities. There
are two primary exceptions to this policy of local autonomy. Individuals
who disagree with a local PSRO determination may appeal to a Statewide
Council, 6 8 and the National Council has the responsibility to determine
whether locally developed norms and standards differ significantly from
regional ones. 69
B.

Norms, Standards, and Criteria

The formulation of the norms, standards, and criteria by which PSROs
review medical care has encountered criticism and hindered understanding
of the program.70 Critics argue that since there is little agreement about
the efficacy of various diagnostic procedures and therapeutic interventions,
there is no basis for standard-setting. Furthermore, it is feared that the
establishment of standards may stagnate medical practice and encourage
"cookbook medicine." On the other hand, the very process of standardsetting may prove highly educational. 71 A brief explanation of the terms
employed and their meaning may be informative.
The PSRO enabling legislation required local PSROs to apply "professionally developed norms of care, diagnosis, and treatment based upon
typical patterns of practice in its regions."7 2 But there was no clear
definition of the term "norms," nor was there any generally accepted
meaning of the terms "standards" and "criteria." Consequently, the
American Medical Association's Advisory Committee on PSRO and the
National PSR Council developed the following definitions :7
Norms: Medical care appraisal norms are numerical or statistical
measures of usual observed performance.
Standards: Standards are professionally developed expressions
of the range of acceptable variation from a norm or criterion.
Criteria:Medical care criteria are predetermined elements against
which aspects of the quality of a medical service may be compared.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-8(b), (c)(1974).

69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-5(a), (c)(1)(1974).
70. See, e.g., Boikess & Winsten, Can PSRO Procedures be Both Fair and
Workable?, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 407, 434-38 (1975); Fifer & Aldrich, The Tyranny
of Standards, 231 J.A.M.A. 709 (1972); Springer, PSROs: Implications for Legal

Liability, THE

HosPITAL MEDICAL STAFF 1

(Jan. 1975). See also

Association

of Am.

Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (plaintiffs
sought to enjoin HEW from implementing the Professional Standards Review Law
primarily on the fifth amendment grounds of overbreadth and vagueness).
71. See Jessee, Munier, Fielding & Goran, PSRO: An Educational Force for
Improving Quality of Care, 292 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 668 (1975).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (1974).
73. See PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 61, at § 709; note 75 infra.
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Thus, a norm is a number, statistic, or statement that is capable of verification. For example, a norm for the length of stay for all patients with
the diagnosis of appendicitis might be five days in a particular PSRO area
or hospital. If a survey of hospitals in a PSRO area reveals that the
average hospital length of stay for all patients with a diagnosis of appendicitis is five days, then five days would be the norm for the area. The
identification of a norm does not disclose whether a situation is good or
bad, simply that it exists. Thus, norms are solely descriptive.
A criterion, on the other hand, is developed through survey, literature examination, or professional experience. It suggests what should be
rather than what is. For example, through an examination of the literature and a consideration of professional expertise, a PSRO might set a
criterion for length of stay in appendicitis cases at four days.
Finally, a standard indicates an acceptable screening variation from
a norm or, most likely, a criterion. For example, the PSRO might decide
that although four days is the optimum length of stay for a patient with
appendicitis, the disease is so variable that a standard of three to seven days
would be acceptable. Cases falling within the standard would "pass"
screening; cases outside the standard would be subjected to peer review.
Norms, criteria, and standards are to be used at each level of PSRO
review. The PSRO Program Manual contemplates their application in
the initial screening of cases to select those that require more detailed review. 74 In-depth review is conducted by peers through a combination of

more detailed norms, criteria, and standards. These peers also assess the
patient's individual clinical and social situation as well as the resources of
75
the institution in which care is provided.
The purpose of screening is to make the review process efficient by
using nonphysicians, who apply criteria that pertain to the proper
diagnosis or treatment of the patient, to identify instances of health care
that fall outside predetermined standards. In applying those standards,
however, some competent practitioners may be subjected to further review
because the particular circumstances of the case involved do not meet the
criteria. For example, a PSRO may have set criteria concerning the
74. Id.
75. Id. The PSRO legislation requires that local PSROs use information supplied to them by the National PSR Council as a principal point of review. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1320c-5(a), (c) (l)-(2) (1974). In partial fulfillment of that continuing responsibility, the National Council, through contract between the American Medical Association and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, has provided model
screening criteria to assist PSROs. See Am. MEDICAL Ass'N, SAMPLE CRITERIA FOR
SHORT-STAY HOSPITAL REVIEW (1976). The AMA contracts, performed in conjunction with thirty-five medical specialty societies, were intended to establish model criteria
for screening the appropriateness, necessity, and quality of medical service in acute care
short-stay general hospitals. Screening criteria were developed for those diagnoses
that account for 75 percent of hospitalizations within each specialty. The criteria, now
in final form, have been distributed to all local medical societies, hospitals, and PSROs
in the country.
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length of hospital stay for a patient with a heart attack, and a particular
case may be identified through screening as exceeding that length of stay.
That case is then referred to peer review, which might determine that the
additional length of stay was justified because of individual complications
that were not considered when the criteria were developed.
The screening criteria provide an effective review mechanism by
76
selecting the small number of cases for which peer review is appropriate.
They reduce physician review time since physicians examine only those
cases in which there is a greater potential that a problem exists. Screening
criteria do not prescribe rigid standards of quality nor determine what
services shall be paid for. They do not preclude physician innovation, nor
do they provide a complete review system that analyzes and evaluates the
quality of care.7 7 It is the subsequent peer review and retrospective indepth study of the specific problems that require more comprehensive
criteria.
The AMA model criteria 78 form the foundation for the development
of local PSRO standards. Over time, norms, criteria, and standards should
be developed for each major diagnosis, health problem, or procedure that
will be reviewed. Since the completion of this venture will take many
years, the early focus will be on high priority situations identified by the
local PSRO because of the frequency of the disease process, the degree of
health improvement possible, and the degree to which inappropriate utilization or substandard quality is evident. 79
To alleviate the fear that the establishment of standards will stagnate
the development of medicine, the statute requires local PSROs to provide
a plan for periodic review and modification of the standards.80 Although
this review process alone does not guarantee current standards, it is hoped
that local physician organizations charged with the formulation of standards
will be flexible and amenable to change.
One beneficial aspect of the PSRO structure is the educational potential. If PSROs are to set standards for the evaluation of the quality
of care, there must be some determination that information used to construct the standards and criteria is valid. The history of standard setting,
though sparse, suggests that there is substantial disagreement within the
76. AM.
iv-vi (1976).
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77. Id. Examples of screening criteria categories are justification and reason for
admission, length of stay, validation of diagnosis, critical diagnostic and treatment
services, discharge status, and complications. See id. at 4-11. With a diagnosis of
appendicitis, for instance, the critical therapeutic service would be appendectomy or
drainage of abcess, and a factor in the discharge status would be that the patient
was afebrile. If the criteria are not met, the patient record would be passed on for
peer review.
78. See note 75 supra.
79. PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 61, at § 709.13.

80. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(c) (1) (1974).
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medical profession on the nature of valid medical information."' Little
is known about the actual value of many diagnostic procedures and
therapeutic interventions. s2 In fact, some studies indicate that much of
the data used in clinical practice may simply be wrong. 3 This uncertainty
means that many of the conclusions expressed in scientific papers, upon
which many practitioners rely, cannot be supported with statistics.8 4 The
problem of uncertainty suggests two considerations with respect to PSROs.
First, criteria setting must necessarily be general, and standards should
allow wide variation in those general areas. Second, the determination
that a specific piece of information is invalid indicates that further research
is desirable.
Thus, PSRO promotes medical education by encouraging practitioners
to ask questions about the nature of curable diseases, the success of present
medical care process, the availability of methods of diagnosis and treatment,
and the validity of the information available concerning those methods.
This inquiry does not force the patterns of practice into "cookbook
medicine" any more than it requires that research be done. The questioning by the local PSRO in its standard-setting process may open a dialogue
between the researcher and the practitioner. The process of inquiry informs
the researcher about the areas where practitioners have difficulty, and it
also transfers valid information back to the practitioner.
C. The Mechanism of Review
When the PSRO legislation was enacted, there was little practical
experience with scientific review that emphasized patient outcomes; most
systems concentrated on the input stage of health care delivery. But the
previous systems (e.g., scoring, statistical, and scientific) provided the
basic elements with which to develop an effective methodology for examining both the medical care process and, more importantly, its outcome.8 5
Furthermore, with the advent of group practices, health maintenance
organizations, specialization, and the increasing responsibility of institutions for the quality of medical care they provide, there is less of the
81. See Emlet, Williamson, Casey, Davis, Dittmer, Flagle & Miller, ALTERNATIV
METHODS

FOR

ESTIMATING

HEALTH-CARE

BENEFITS

AND

REQUIRED

REsouRcEs

2

(Analystic Services, Nov. 30, 1971).

82. Id.
83. See, e.g., id.; Williamson, Evaluating Quality of Patient Care: A Strategy
Relating Outcome and Process Assessment, 218 J.A.M.A. 564 (1971); Williamson,
Alexander & Miller, Priorities in Patient-Care Research and Continuing Medical
Education, 204 J.A.M.A. 303 (1968); Williamson & van Nieuwenhuijzen, Health
Benefit Analysis: An Application in Industrial Absenteeism, 16 J. Occup. MED.

220 (1974).
84. See, e.g., Feinstein, A Survey of the Statistical Procedures in General Medical

Journals,15 CLIN. PHARM. & THERAP. 97 (1973) ; Schor & Karten, Statistical Evaluation of Medical Journal Manuscripts, 195 J.A.M.A. 1123 (1966).
85. See Williamson, Evaluating Quality of Patient Care: A Strategy Relating
Outcome and Process Assessment, 218 J.A.M.A. 564 (1971).
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fragmentation that once characterized the practice of medicine when it
was dominated by single practitioners.8 6 The growth of interrelated responsibility for care has exposed more of the practice of medicine to public
view and this exposure makes it easier to evaluate the various patterns of
health care delivery.
PSRO review integrates three separate review mechanisms: concurrent review, which involves admission certification and continued stay
review; medical care evaluation studies; and institutional provider, practitioner, and patient profiles.8 7 The purpose of the concurrent review
system is to assure that hospital admissions are necessary, that length of
hospital stays are appropriate and that patients are discharged at the
proper time."" Through the first component of concurrent review, admission certification, the medical necessity of admission is examined and an
initial length of stay established. In practice, a trained nonphysician will
compare the admitting diagnosis with PSRO-developed criteria for admission. If the patient were admitted with the diagnosis of appendicitis, then,
under the AMA criteria,89 either a suspicion of acute appendicitis or a
previously scheduled operation for the disease would justify admission.
After admission has been approved, an initial length of stay, based on
PSRO norms, would be assigned. 90 Continued stay review would complete
concurrent review, inquiring whether critical diagnostic and treatment
criteria were satisfied by the patient's care and whether the patient outcome was appropriate.91 If the initial reviewer of the record discovers a
conflict with the screening criterion, the individual record would be forwarded to the physician reviewer for further scrutiny. But an inconsistency with screening criterion does not necessarily mean denial of
reimbursement.
The purpose of medical care evaluation (MCE) studies, the second
element of PSRO review, is to improve quality through systematic study.
This process is designed to identify deficiencies in the quality of health care
and in the organization and administration of its delivery, to correct such
deficiencies through education and administrative change, and to reassess
performance periodically to assure that improvements have been maintained.9 2 MCEs also help to determine the effectiveness of concurrent review and assist in validating norms, criteria, and standards.
86. See

INTERSTUDY, supra note 10, at 35-39.
PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 61,

87. PSRO

at § 701.

88. Id.

89.

Am. MEDIcAL

ASS'N,

SAMPLE CPITERIA FOR SHORT-STAY HosPITAL REmw

67 (1976) ; see note 75 supra.
90. PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 61, at §§ 705 - 70526.
91. Id. at § 705.21.
92. Id. at § 705.31.
93. Director, Bureau of Quality Assurance, Health Services Administration,
Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Draft Transmittal - BQA Policy on Medical
Care Evaluation (MCE) Studies (HEW memorandum, Aug. 22, 1976).
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The first is priority setting,

which involves the identification of what problem, diagnosis, or procedure
should be subject to study. 4 The second step is criteria setting. MCE
criteria would contain the same elements (admission justification, diagnostic
services, etc.) as screening criteria, 95 but would be more comprehensive
and would be designed to evaluate patterns of care rather than screening
individual admissions. 96 The last five steps in the MCE are the audit
or review process, problem definition, problem etiology determination and
identification of the failure in process leading to a poor outcome, change
in process with a view to bettering the outcome, and reaudit (reevaluation
97
following change in process).
An example will illustrate the MCE process. If priority setting
identified hypertension as a possible MCE subject, the PSRO would
develop criteria for hypertension. Data developed from the audit review
process might reveal a wide disparity in incidence within the PSRO of
myocardial infarction, stroke, and renal disease. Poor outcomes being part
of the problem identification step in the MCE, further evaluation might
reveal a correlation between low incidence of complications and an active
post-hospitalization patient education program. In that case, the MCE
would have served a useful purpose in providing the data on the beneficial
effect of patient education that changed the process of care.
The third major component of PSRO review is profile analysis, which
attempts to monitor the effectiveness of the other components of the
review system and to determine their optimal use. 95 In addition, by
distinguishing between normal and consistently aberrant practice patterns,
profile analysis allows the PSRO or hospital to modify their concurrent
review programs to focus on defined problems. Profile analysis may
further involve a comparison of physicians' practices and of hospitals' health
services delivery in such gross areas of patient outcomes as mortality and
morbidity, and in areas of health services utilization such as average length
of stay and inpatient cost. Where such comparisons indicate significant
variation, the PSRO may choose to institute an MCE or to examine its
concurrent review criteria.
94. Although particular methods of priority setting will be left up to local

PSROs, guidelines that relate to patient benefit have been suggested. Diagnoses
which would be appropriate for early MCEs might have the following characteristics:
a high frequency of occurrence, a high health system impact, a high level of agreement within the medical profession regarding the appropriate process of care, clearly
identifiable outcomes, complications both identifiable and due to the medical care
process, a natural history shown to vary with treatment, increased morbidity if services
are underutilized, and amenability to data-gathering. See Goran, Roberts, Kellogg,
Fielding & Jessee, The PSRO Hospital Review System, 13 MEDIcA CARE 1, 19
(Apr. 1975 Supp.).
95. See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
96. See PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 61, at § 705.35.

97. Goran, Roberts, Kellogg, Fielding & Jessee, The PSRO Hospital Review
System, 13 MEDICAL CARE 1, 19-22 (Apr. 1975 Supp.).
98. PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 61, at § 701.
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CONCLUSION

The malpractice liability system is inefficient as a means of compensating injured patients, disciplining negligent health care providers,
and assuring the public that they will receive quality health care. Although
it may encourage defensive medicine (i.e., providing more care than may
be necessary in order to avoid a malpractice suit) or force physicians to
change a prevailing standard of care in response to losing a malpractice
suit, these rather uncertain and haphazard benefits have not significantly
altered the structure of health care so as to assure consumers that they
receive quality medical care. Nevertheless, because the malpractice system
is the only means through which the consumer can express his dissatisfaction with negligently administered medical care and hope to obtain relief
for his injuries, the public and the plaintiffs' bar perceive the system as a
quality assurance mechanism.
This article has attempted to present a coherent description of the
practice and theory of PSRO. If the program successfully assures the
public of better quality medical care, then some of the problems now
caused by the present medical malpractice liability system may be alleviated.
Since PSRO applies objective standards within an organization that
systematically examines patterns of practice, it can identify poor outcomes,
locate the associated failure of practice, and change the practice so as to
change the outcome. In this fashion it is able to complete the feedback
loop which the malpractice system leaves open. PSRO is not, however,
a complete alternative to the malpractice system. It neither compensates
injured patients nor disciplines negligent doctors. Nevertheless, by supplying a method of quality control that is more effective than the malpractice
system, PSRO may encourage the development of alternatives to malpractice liability in the areas of compensation and provider discipline.

